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PREVIEW: Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue:
Does Montana’s Blaine Amendment Violate the Free Exercise
Clause?
Katy Lindberg
The United States Supreme Court is set to hear oral argument
on this matter Wednesday, January 22, 2020, at 10:00 am, in the
Supreme Court Building, Washington D.C. Richard D. Komer is
likely to appear for Petitioners, and Adam G. Unikowsky is likely to
appear for Respondents.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This case raises the issue of whether the Free Exercise and
Establishment clauses of the First Amendment, and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, require a state to
allow generally available and religiously neutral student aid to
students attending a religious school.1 The United States Supreme
Court’s decision on the Montana Supreme Court’s interpretation of
Montana’s Blaine Amendment could have important implications
for states with constitutional prohibitions on state aid to religious
schools.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2018, the Montana Supreme Court invalidated a 2015 tax
program that provided a dollar for dollar tax credit, up to $150, for
donations to Student Scholarship Organizations, which provided
scholarships to students attending private schools, including
religious schools.2 Justice McKinnon, writing for the majority, held
the Program, allowed the Legislature to indirectly pay tuition and
therefore impermissibly aided religious schools under Montana’s
Blaine Amendment, Article X, Section 6.3 Because “the
overwhelming majority” of the schools receiving the scholarships
1
See Brief for Petitioners, at i, Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue
(U.S. Sep. 11, 2019) (No. 18-1195); Brief of Respondents at i, Espinoza v.
Montana Dept. of Revenue (U.S. Nov. 8, 2019) (No. 18-1195).
2
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 606
(Mont. 2018).
3
Id. at 612.
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were religious schools,4 and because taxpayers could not direct
funds to a specific school, the court found the Legislature could not
ensure the funds went only to secular education.5 Further, if a
religious school did receive funds, there was no way to know “where
the secular purpose ended, and the sectarian began.”6
Justice Gustafson concurred, agreeing the Program violated
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.7 Justice Baker dissented, asserting a tax credit is not
an indirect appropriation.8 Justice Rice also dissented, asserting the
Program was neutral with respect to religion, and thus constitutional
under both Montana’s and United States’ constitutions.9
III.

ARGUMENTS

a. Petitioners
Petitioners argue Montana’s application of Article X,
Section 6 violated the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses of
the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.10
Petitioners assert that Montana’s application of Article X,
Section 6 violates the Free Exercise clause because it prohibited all
religious groups from receiving funding under the tax credit
program.11 Petitioners argue the invalidation of the program
discriminated against their religious beliefs, conduct, and status.12
Further, because religious schools were excluded from the program,
the schools also faced discrimination for their beliefs, status and
conduct.13 Petitioners urge the Court to examine the lower court’s
4

schools.

5

12 out of 13 schools that benefited from the program were religious

Id. at 613.
Id. (citing State ex rel. Chambers v. School Dist. No. 10 of Deer Lodge
County, 472 P.2d 1013, 1021 (Mont. 1970)).
7
Id. at 620-21 (Gustafson, J., concurring). Justice Sandefur also
concurred.
8
Id. at 626-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9
Id. at 632-33 (Rice, J., dissenting).
10
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 13.
11
Id. at 26–28.
12
Id. at 17–19.
13
Id. at 19–20.
6
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application of the Article X, Section 6 under strict scrutiny and that
no sufficient compelling state interest exists.14
Additionally, Petitioners argue Article X, Section 6 violates
the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection clause because it draws an
impermissible line between students attending religious schools and
secular schools and it discriminates against students seeking a
religious education.15 Petitioners assert that because Article X,
Section 6 was enacted out of animus toward Catholics, Montana’s
application of the clause violated the Equal Protection Clause.16
Several amici argue for total invalidation of Article X, Section 6
under the Equal Protection Clause as well.17
Finally, Petitioners argue Article X, Section 6 as applied
demonstrates prohibited state hostility toward religion, violating the
Establishment Clause.18 The lower court’s “unbending commitment
to secularism . . . tramples upon [petitioner’s] religious rights.”19
b. Respondents
The Montana Department of Revenue’s primary argument
centers around the Free Exercise Clause.20 Because the lower court
invalidated the Program in its entirety, the Department argues there
was no prohibition on, or coercion of, religious practice.21 The
Department also asserts that Article X, Section 6 violates neither the
Equal Protection Clause nor the Establishment Clause.22
Addressing Free Exercise concerns, Respondents
distinguish the present facts from those in Trinity Lutheran, arguing
14

Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 29–31.
16
Id. at 44–45.
17
See generally Amicus Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
at 4–17, Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue (U.S. Sep. 11, 2019) (No. 181195); Amicus Brief for Senators Steve Daines, et al. at 27–30, Espinoza v.
Montana Dept. of Revenue (U.S. Sep. 11, 2019) (No. 18-1195); Amicus Brief for
the Montana Family Foundation at 12–13, Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue
(U.S. Sep. 11, 2019) (No. 18-1195).
18
Id. at 14.
19
Id. at 47.
20
See Brief of Respondents, supra note 1 at 10–49.
21
Id. at 11–13.
22
Id. at 49–55.
15
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neither the lower court decision, nor Article X, Section 6 constitute
a prohibition on the free exercise of religion.23 Unlike Trinity
Lutheran, Respondents argue the lower court’s decision was not
coercive because all groups stopped receiving aid through the
program—regardless of their religious affiliation.24
Finally, Respondents address Equal Protection and
Establishment Clause concerns. Because the lower court decision
invalidated the program, denying aid to all schools, Respondents
argue there is no unequal treatment, and therefore no Equal
Protection Clause violation.25 Additionally, Respondents challenge
Petitioner’s animus claim by discussing the history and purpose of
Article X, Section 6, and similar clauses across the country, and
explaining the clauses were enacted not out of bigotry, but to protect
religious freedom.26 Further, Respondents argue Article X, Section
6 as applied protects religious freedom rather than enforcing
secularism, and does not violate the Establishment Clause because
it is not hostile toward religion.27
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Court’s decision will likely turn on whether Article X,
Section 6, as applied to invalidate the Program, served to exclude
religious schools from a generally available benefit, violating the
Free Exercise Clause.
Arguably, this a strange case for the Court to make a shift in
its Free Exercise jurisprudence. Petitioners argue Montana’s
application of Article X, Section 6 violated the Free Exercise
Clause. Yet, the Montana Supreme Court invalidated the program
completely, so Petitioners are left to argue that the Court should
require Montana to enforce a program that, under the Montana
Supreme Court’s interpretation, violates the Montana
Constitution.28 Respondents assert such action by the Court would
grossly violate federalism because it would remove a state’s choice
in determining whether state funded school-choice programs can
23

Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
25
Id. at 50–51.
26
See Id. at 17–36.
27
Id. at 52–54.
28
Id. at 46.
24
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fund religious schools.29 Further, Respondents argue the Court
should not force Montana to administer a law that violates its own
constitution.30
If the Court agrees with Petitioners and finds Montana’s
application of Article X, Section 6 violated the Free Exercise
Clause, Blaine Amendments around the country could be rendered
toothless.31 Many states rely on their constitution’s no-aid clauses
to strike down school-choice programs providing aid for religious
education.32 If Montana’s application of Article X, Section 6
violates the Free Exercise Clause, states that wish to limit state aid
to religious schools under their no-aid clauses may have their hands
tied.33
Many amici have asserted that clauses like Article X, Section
6 violate the Free Exercise Clause, and have asked the Court to
invalidate Blaine Amendments as a whole. 34 If the Court invalidates
Article X, Section 6, similar clauses existing in 37 state constitutions
could also be invalidated.35 Many of these clauses were enacted in
the early 1800s,36 and it would be unprecedented for the Court to
overturn these provisions.37
This case is flanked by two crucial religious freedom cases:
Locke v. Davey38 and Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v.
Comer.39 The Locke court recognized there is “play in the joints”
between the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses, and decided
a state’s choice to not fund religious instruction fell within this

29

Id.
Id. at 46–47.
31
Id. at 44.
32
See Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178, 1184 (Ariz. 2009); Bush v. Holmes,
886 So. 2d 340, 366 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 2004).
33
Brief of Respondents, supra note 1 at 44.
34
See generally Amicus Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
at 4–17, supra note 17; Amicus Brief for Senators Steve Daines, et al. at 27–30,
supra note 17; Amicus Brief for the Montana Family Foundation at 12–13, supra
note 17.
35
Id. at 41.
36
Id.
37
Brief of Respondents, supra note 1 at 44.
38
540 U. S. 712 (2004).
39
137 S.Ct. 2012 (2017).
30
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gap.40 Currently, there is a circuit split about how much “play” exists
between the “joints” of the religious clauses. While some courts
interpreted Locke to allow states to exclude all religious schools
from aid programs,41 other courts held religious schools should
receive aid under Locke.42
More recently, the Court in Trinity Lutheran held a state
cannot deny a generally available benefit to a church without
violating the Free Exercise Clause.43 However, the majority
specifically noted in a footnote that their analysis did not address
“religious uses of funding or other forms of discrimination.”44
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch did not join this footnote, asserting a
state cannot discriminate based on religious use or religious status.45
This case gives the Court an opportunity to expand on,
and/or distinguish between, Locke and Trinity Lutheran, resolving
whether Trinity Lutheran’s holding extends to religious uses of state
aid. With a conservative majority, the court seems poised to expand
upon Trinity Lutheran and prohibit states from denying generally
available aid to religious schools for religious education. This
outcome could render Blaine Amendments across the country
useless or could even invalidate such provisions entirely. The extent
of the Court’s decision will likely come down to Chief Justice
Roberts.
While the Petitioners primarily focus on the Free Exercise
Clause, they also assert Equal Protection and Establishment clause
violations.46 Whether Montana’s application of Article X, Section 6
violated the Equal Protection Clause depends on the Court’s
interpretation of the clause’s history, specifically whether it
“represents a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular

40

Locke, at 719.
See Eulitt ex rel. Eulitt v. Me. Dept. of Educ., 386 F.3d 344, 355 (1st
Cir. 2004); Anderson v. Town of Durham, 895 A.2d 944, 961 (Me. 2006).
42
See Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1258
(10th Cir. 2008); Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 780 (7th Cir.
2010).
43
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc., at 2022.
44
Id. at 2024 n.3.
45
Id. at 2026 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).
46
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 28.
41
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group.”47 If the Court finds it was, it is likely to conclude Montana’s
application of the clause, or the clause itself, violates the Equal
Protection Clause because the state’s differing treatment of students
attending religious and non-religious schools was “born out of
animosity.”48
The Establishment Clause argument also hinges on whether
Montana’s application of Article X, Section 6 represents
impermissible hostility towards religion.49 The Establishment
Clause prohibits states from actively supporting or hindering the
exercise of religion.50 If the Court determines that Montana’s
application of Article X, Section 6, or the clause itself, “foster[ed] a
pervasive . . . hostility to religion,”51 it will overturn Montana’s
decision under the Establishment Clause.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court’s decision has the potential to settle the postLocke debate of how much “play” exists between the Free Exercise
and Establishment clauses, and whether the “play” allows states to
exclude religious schools from receiving state aid. If the Court
decides Article X, Section 6 as applied by the Montana Supreme
Court violated the Free Exercise Clause, the decision could have
large implications for the 37 states with no-aid clauses.

47

See Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 40–44; Brief for
Petitioners, supra note 1, at 31–45.
48
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
49
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 45–46.
50
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 532 (1993).
51
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of U. of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510,
2525 (1995).

